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Abstract
Municipal governance in the Montreal metropolitan region has recently undergone several phases of 
transformation. Th e fi rst, in 2001-2002, was characterized by amalgamation and the introduction of a 
metropolitan governance structure. Th is was followed, in 2006, by a round of de-amalgamation. Using annual 
municipal data on residential tax base and global tax rate covering the period from 1996 to 2011 for all 
municipalities of the metropolitan area, the impacts of these reforms on fairness are estimated. Our fi ndings 
show that amalgamation raises equity among municipalities and that de-amalgamation partly reintroduced 
inequity in the metropolitan area. 
Keywords: urban governance, amalgamation, Montreal, equity 
Résumé
La gouvernance municipale dans la région métropolitaine de Montréal a été l’objet de plusieurs transformations 
au cours des dernières années. Les premières réformes de 2001-2002 ont été caractérisées par une phase de 
fusions municipales et la mise en place d’une structure de gouvernance métropolitaine. La deuxième vague de 
réformes, en 2006, a quant à elle mené à une série de défusions municipales. À l’aide de données sur les assiettes 
fi scales et les taux globaux de taxation de l’ensemble des municipalités de la région métropolitaine de Montréal, 
couvrant la période 1996-2011, cette recherche vise à mesurer l’impact des réformes sur l’équité territoriale. Les 
résultats montrent que les fusions ont amélioré l’équité fi scale entre les municipalités, alors que les défusions ont 
partiellement réintroduit de l’iniquité dans la région métropolitaine. 
Mot clés: gouvernance urbaine, fusions municipales, Montréal, équité 
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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990s, the Government of Quebec altered institutional structures in the Montreal metropolitan region. 
Th ese changes include the creation of a regional governance body, the Montreal Metropolitan Community 
(MMC), in 2001, as well as the amalgamation of a number of municipalities in 2002 in central Montreal and 
in several major suburbs such as Longueuil, Terrebonne and Repentigny (see table 1).  However, the election 
of a new provincial government in Quebec in 2003 initiated a de-amalgamation process, which culminated in 
the demerger of several municipalities in Montreal and Longueuil in 2006. As a result, agglomeration councils 
were created to provide services on the territory of formerly amalgamated cities, all of which were obligated 
to join in these structures. Th e main goal of the fi rst reform was to ensure greater cohesion in the production 
of local public services in the metropolitan area while achieving a consolidated central city (Sancton 2003). 
Th e de-amalgamation reform resulted in an institutional structure that is almost as fragmented as it originally 
was. As Sancton (2005) mentions, this vacillation between opposite reforms renders Montreal’s governance 
arrangements quite complex and unique. As such, they constitute an interesting case for further analysis.
Several studies on the economic impact of consolidation and fragmentation of local governance structures 
examine metropolitan areas in the United States (Hamilton, Miller & Paytas 2004; Edwards 2008; Jiminez 
& Hendrick 2010; Martin & Schiff  2011; Kim & Jurey 2013). Others analyse local government reforms in 
Northern Europe and the Middle East (Reingewertz 2012; Moisio & Uusitalo 2013). Researchers have also 
examined municipal consolidation in Canada (Vojnovic 2000; Sancton 2000; Reese 2004; Kushner & Siegel 
2005; Schwartz 2009; Slack & Bird 2013). Th e case of Montreal has also been studied by Tomàs (2012) and 
Meloche & Vaillancourt (2015). However, the economic impact of municipal reforms has not been investigated 
in the specifi c case of Montreal. Considering the atypical nature of this case as well as the variety of reforms 
that have been implemented in the metropolitan area, Montreal stands to provide valuable information about 
the impact on equity of both amalgamation and de-amalgamation. Equity is understood as a low variation in 
the distribution of fi scal eff ort conceptualized in terms of two indicators: fi scal base and tax rate. Th e analysis is 
based on the convergence of these indicators among all municipalities in the area estimated for three periods: 
the pre-merger (1996-2000), the merger (2001-2005) and the post-merger (2006-2011) periods. Th e number 
of municipalities from which data is available varies from 98 in the initial period, to 61 after consolidation, and 
78 after de-amalgamation. 
Th e article is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section presents the conceptual framework and the main 
arguments in favor of amalgamation. Th e second section provides more details on the specifi c case of Montreal 
and introduces the data used in the experiment. Th e third section focuses on the analysis of equity by way of 
measuring fi scal eff ort and convergence. Th e fi ndings are discussed in the conclusion.   
THE RATIONALE FOR AMALGAMATION
Municipal consolidation is usually understood as the structural merging of two or more municipal governments 
into one (Martin & Schiff  2011). Th e term amalgamation is used as a perfect synonym for city-consolidation. As 
stated by Edwards (2008), the process may also relate to large-scale annexation when compulsory amalgamation 
comprise appropriation of small suburban municipalities by a dominant central city. Reformists propose city-
consolidation as a solution to problems arising from the fragmentation of metropolitan areas (Stephens & 
Wikstrom 2000), that is the division of a metropolitan territory into a large number of local governments, which 
may include overlapping jurisdictions (Hamilton, Miller, & Paytas 2004; Hendrick, Jiminez, & Lal 2011). It 
remains unclear whether fragmentation is a problem for metropolitan governance. Common arguments in 
support of consolidation include fairness and cost savings, as well as cohesion in urban and regional planning, 
economic development and local democracy.      
Th e issue of fairness
In public fi nance, a system is considered fair when the fi scal arrangements impose equal liabilities on people who 
have the same ability to pay (Rosen et al. 1999). It can also mean that the tax liability is supported by those who 
benefi t from the services provided. Th e concept of equity can be interpreted in many ways. For instance, equity 
between territories does not necessarily imply equity between individuals. Th e focus here is on equity between 
municipalities. In this context, a fair fi scal arrangement allows municipalities to provide equal services to their 
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citizens at equal costs. Th is implies that the fi scal eff ort should be similar for similar services. In other words, 
equity between municipalities in a metropolitan area should materialize through similar tax rates for similar 
output per consumer of public services.
A widely assumed consequence of fragmentation in local governance structures is the uneven provision of 
services due to the unequal capacity of local municipalities to generate fi scal revenue (Kim & Jurey 2013; Martin 
& Schiff  2011; Jiminez & Hendrick 2010). Th is is an indirect consequence of Tiebout’s (1956) sorting model, in 
which citizens “vote with their feet” by moving from one jurisdiction to another in search of the bundle of local 
services and level of local taxes that match their preference. A fundamental assumption of the model, however, 
is that all households have the same income. Discounting this hypothesis, sorting may not be based solely on 
preferences, but also on fi nancial capacity. Th e exclusion of poor households through zoning regulations can 
preserve the high fi scal capacity of some municipalities (Ulfarsson & Carruthers 2006, Rothwell & Massey 
2010), which can then maintain low tax rates for higher levels of spending per capita. In these circumstances, 
fragmentation generates inequalities by creating space for fi scal segregation. Th e phenomenon does not only 
concern residential choices, but also applies to commercial and industrial locations.   
Historically, the main rationale for large cities to annex surrounding municipalities has been to off set the 
fi scal implications of the migration of the middle and upper classes to the suburbs (Edwards 2008). A large part 
of the motivation for annexation was also to capture commercial and industrial property taxes in neighboring 
jurisdictions. Heim (2012) corroborates this statement, arguing that tax revenue has been a key motivation 
for municipal annexation in Phoenix, Arizona. Tanguay & Wihry’s (2008) study of the demerger referenda 
in Montreal points in the same direction, as they fi nd that voters were less likely to support de-amalgamation 
if they expected that this would lead to an increase in the tax-price of local public services. Reese (2004) also 
reports that consolidation increased equity within the Ottawa metropolitan area by improving the distribution 
of programs and amenities as well as fi scal eff ort. Similarly, Slack & Bird (2013) fi nd that amalgamation in 
Toronto is likely to have contributed to the equalization of services between municipalities and the reduction of 
the residential property tax burden in poor neighborhoods. 
Th e results are slightly diff erent when equity is considered in terms of a fair distribution of personal income. 
For instance, Sacher (1993) estimates the impact of local taxes and expenditures on the distribution of income 
in metropolitan Washington DC in the current fragmented system and under a hypothetical metropolitan-
wide regime. He fi nds that amalgamation has no impact on equity. Many other studies are unable to fi nd 
any signifi cant relationship between consolidation and disparities in personal or household income in a 
metropolitan region (Austin 1999; Morgan & Mareschal 1999; Post & Stein 2000; Martin & Schiff  2011). 
Although Jepson (2008) fi nds that ethnic poverty is less concentrated in consolidated city-counties in the 
United States, Jiminez (2014) nevertheless argues that race, rather than revenue, drives local population sorting 
in American metropolitan areas.   
Behavior mimicking also infl uences the fi scal choices of municipal governments. Th e literature on tax 
competition (Wilson 1999) and yardstick competition (Besley & Case 1995) suggests that municipalities set 
their fi scal policies in response to their neighbors’ choices. As a consequence, the tax rates and expenditures of 
municipalities in a metropolitan area should converge. Accordingly, Skidmore & Deller (2008) fi nd convergence 
in local government spending per capita in Wisconsin between 1990 and 2000. As for revenue, Annala (2003) 
fi nds convergence in the average municipal property tax burden between states in the United States. To 
our knowledge, no study has looked precisely at the simultaneous convergence of tax base and tax rates in 
a metropolitan context. In a fragmented metropolitan area marked by fi scal inequality among municipalities, 
policy measures that favor the amalgamation of wealthy and poor communities should stimulate equity. In the 
extreme case of a complete merger, a single tax rate and budget would be adopted for the amalgamated territory, 
meaning that full mergers are tantamount to perfect equity. 
Many questions arise from this discussion of the literature. What happens when consolidation includes 
only part of a metropolitan area? For instance, merging only rich municipalities in a single city may not have 
any eff ect on equity. If amalgamation is intended to enhance equity, what happens in cases where municipalities 
are allowed to demerge? Are demergers a threat to fairness? Th e Montreal metropolitan area off ers a relevant 
context to investigate these questions.    
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Th e issue of cost saving
Th e expected impact of fragmentation on the cost of local services is not clear. Th e reformist view holds that 
smaller governments are unable to benefi t from economies of scale and economies of scope ( Jiminez & Hendrick 
2010; Boyne 1992). A higher number of overlapping governments may also result in “overfi shing” in the shared 
tax base, an issue known as the common pool problem (Berry 2008). As such, amalgamation should reduce the 
costs of delivering local public services. On the other hand, Tiebout’s (1956) sorting mechanism and yardstick 
competition (Besley & Case 1995) may stimulate the effi  ciency of municipal governments in fragmented 
metropolitan areas. Moreover, economies of scale might not be as important as assumed by reformists (Hanes 
2015). As Hirsh (1959) states, economies of scale are usually limited in the production of local government 
services, with the exception of water and sewage infrastructure networks. Found (2012) confi rms these limits 
when looking at fi re and police services. 
Most empirical studies fail to fi nd a signifi cant link between horizontal fragmentation or city-consolidation 
and local spending (Martin & Schiff  2011; Hendrick, Jiminez & Lal 2011). For instance, Faulk & Grassmueck 
(2012) show that per capita expenditures in consolidated communities are not statistically diff erent from that of 
other municipalities. Moisio & Uusitalo (2013) fi nd similar results in Finland. Edwards & Xiao (2009) point that 
while annexation may infl uence spending, accompanying changes in density levels complicate the measurement 
of the eff ects. In Ontario, Kushner & Siegel (2005) and Schwartz (2009) conclude that amalgamation did not 
deliver the savings predicted by reformists. On the contrary, they observe signifi cant increases in administrative 
expenditures. A study on municipal amalgamation in Israel (Reingewertz 2012) provides empirical support for 
the idea of cost effi  ciency gains related to amalgamation. Limited evidence is also found in Hanes’s (2015) study 
of the Swedish municipal reform of 1952. However, his fi ndings suggest that effi  ciency gains are only observed 
up to a limited threshold, estimated to 12,800 inhabitants.  
Issues of urban planning, economic development and local democracy
Variation in planning regulations across jurisdictions is another consequence of Tiebout’s (1956) sorting 
model in a fragmented metropolitan area. Uncoordinated planning in a fragmented region may complicate the 
provision of local services whose benefi ts or costs are not contained within municipal boundaries. Th ese services 
characterized by externalities need coordination across municipal boundaries for effi  cient delivery. Furthermore, 
the use of exclusionary zoning in some municipalities may exacerbate urban sprawl (Ulfarsson & Carruthers 
2006, Jiminez 2014). Jepson (2008) partially challenges this claim as he fi nds no signifi cant relation between city-
county consolidation and urban sprawl. Other planning benefi ts are also found to be unrelated to consolidation, 
such as central city vitality or compact urban development ( Jepson 2008). Although coordination tools exist to 
soften the negative impacts of fragmentation on planning issues, most empirical studies suggest that it is more 
diffi  cult to eff ectively manage planning processes in a fragmented environment (Kim & Jurey 2013).          
One major argument supporting consolidation is that it facilitates economic development. As metropolitan 
areas compete to attract new businesses, the gathering of resources for economic promotion under a single roof 
may be helpful (Kim & Jurey 2013; Martin & Schiff  2011). Th ere is however very limited empirical support 
for this claim (Carr & Feiock 1999, Jepson Jr. 2008). Many studies even suggest that fragmentation, rather 
than consolidation, is associated with economic growth (Nelson & Foster 1999; Stansel 2005; Grassmueck & 
Shields 2010). Th is lack of empirical support for the impact on economic development may be surprising since 
it is considered the most convincing argument to gain popular support for consolidation in the US (Leland and 
Th ormaier 2005). It has also been a major argument put forth by provincial authorities to justify compulsory 
amalgamation in Canadian cities (Garcea & LeSage 2005).  
Lastly, from a political point of view, it is often argued that amalgamation aff ects the quality of local 
democracy (Hamilton 2012, Denters & al. 2014). According to localists, bigger jurisdictions, which result from 
consolidation, are less accountable to the public, diminish participation in democratic processes and limit access 
to political leaders (Hamilton 2012). Some authors also argue that it may dilute the political representation 
of minorities (Martin & Schiff  2011). Reformists challenge these arguments, contending instead that bigger 
jurisdictions foster a more effi  cient democracy and stimulate local participation (Ostrom, 1972). Since the work 
of Dahl & Tufte (1973) on size and democracy, there have been several studies on the topic. Although Lassen 
& Serritzlew  (2011) fi nd that jurisdiction size has a “sizeable” negative eff ect on citizens’ internal political 
effi  cacy in Denmark, most studies fi nd weak empirical support for that claim (Denter & al. 2014). According 
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to Hamilton (2012), there is “enough contrary evidence” to the argument that consolidation reduces the quality 
of local democracy. On the other hand, the literature rarely point to any positive contribution of amalgamation 
to local democracy.
As described here, the rationale for city amalgamation is based on several economic and political arguments. 
Although we recognize that all elements are important to the understanding of amalgamation and its 
consequences, we restrict our empirical analysis to the public fi nance implications of the process, and more 
specifi cally to the issue of fairness.           
 
FROM MERGERS TO DEMERGERS IN MONTREAL
Municipal governments account for 16 % of total provincial and local government spending in Quebec1. 
According to Shah (2006), this is a smaller share than what is usually found in most industrialized countries, 
including the United States. Th is can be attributed to relatively more limited municipal responsibilities in 
Quebec, which do not include social, health or education services. A third of municipal expenditures in Quebec 
are devoted to transportation infrastructure and services (roads and public transit). Other major budget items 
include public safety (police and fi re protection), culture, leisure and sport, water and sewage, and garbage 
collection2. Since all municipalities are multipurpose governments and single-purpose districts are uncommon, 
there is less local jurisdictional overlapping in Quebec than in the United States. As such, horizontal cooperation 
motivates demands for consolidation rather than the elimination of overlapping services or the simplifi cation 
of governance structures. 
      Municipal government autonomy is relatively high in Quebec. Transfers from provincial and federal 
governments account for only 16 % of total revenue, or 20 % when considering transfer payments in lieu of 
taxes.3 Th is means that 80 % of municipal revenue is self-sourced. Equalization grants exist, but only amount 
to 60 million $CAD for all municipalities, which represents 0.3 % of total municipal spending in the province. 
Th us, equalization policy is very weak while municipal autonomy is high in Quebec.
  
A brief historical overview
Several rounds of restructuring have altered the governance of the Montreal metropolitan region since 2000, as 
analyzed by Sancton (2003), Latendresse (2005) and Hamel & Rousseau (2006). A historical overview of these 
reforms is presented below to provide context for the study.
Pierre Bourque, mayor of Montreal from 1994 to 2001, played a signifi cant role in the process as one of the 
only municipal leaders in a city targeted for amalgamation to support the idea. On the other hand, suburban 
opposition remained steadfast, as the sensitive issue of language was brought into the debate, particularly 
in the western part of the Island of Montreal. Despite these protests, the Parti Québécois government used 
its parliamentary majority to adopt Bill 170, a provincial law that imposed amalgamation on a number of 
municipalities. Th en-premier Lucien Bouchard pointed to the benefi ts of equalized taxes and services across the 
new city as a central motivation (Sancton, 2003). Th is fi rst reform was implemented on January 1st, 2002.
Th e impact of the mergers in Montreal was tempered by the fact that several services had already been 
regionalized long before amalgamation. Th e Montreal Urban Community (MUC) had managed services such 
as policing and public transit since the 1970s4. A similar regional entity also existed in Quebec City, but not in 
the other merged municipalities.  
Th e April 2003 provincial elections led to a change in government. During the campaign, the newly elected 
Liberal Party promised, among other things, to hold consultations on the territorial reorganization in order to 
allow for the de-amalgamation of consolidated municipalities, under certain conditions. Th e fi rst condition was 
that 10% of the registered voters within the former municipal borders had to sign a register requesting a vote 
on demerger. If this condition was met, a referendum would be held in which, as a second condition, a majority 
vote in favor of de-amalgamation had to represent at least 35% of all registered voters in order to trigger a 
demerger. Even though 27 municipalities organized a referendum in the metropolitan area in 2004 after having 
met the fi rst condition, and 26 voted in favor of demerging, only 19 met the second condition and regained 
their independent status on January 1st, 2006: 15 on the Island of Montreal and 4 around Longueuil. No other 
municipality has demerged since.
De-amalgamation was only partial though, as the Government of Quebec created agglomeration 
councils, new political structures that encompass the territory of former amalgamated cities. In Montreal, the 
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Agglomeration Council is very similar to the previous Urban Community, with the important distinction that 
the mayor of the City of Montreal now holds more power. Demerged municipalities are now called “tied 
municipalities”, as they must operate within the constraints of, and are thus tied to, the Agglomeration Council 
despite having regained a level of autonomy5. Agglomeration councils were created for all cities that experienced 
demergers. Consequently, there are two agglomeration councils in the metropolitan area: one for Montreal and 
one for Longueuil6.
As the mayor of Montreal stated in the late 1990s, the goal of the mergers was to rebalance the fi nancial 
relationship between his city and its suburbs (Sancton 2005). It is then relevant to consider the evolution of fi scal 
disparity through the structural changes that occurred in the Montreal metropolitan region between 1996 and 
2011, and how these changes have aff ected municipal spending. While the Montreal experiment is not assumed 
to be typical, it provides an interesting arena to explore the impact of municipal governance reforms since it is 
one of the rare instances where a metropolitan area has experienced both consolidation and fragmentation in a 
relatively short timeframe.
Data for the analysis
Th e municipal reforms in the Montreal metropolitan region provide an opportunity to study the impact of 
city-consolidation during three distinct periods from 1996 to 2011. Th e fi rst comprises the initial situation, 
during which no municipality had merged or demerged (1996-2001); the second encompasses a period when 
several municipalities were amalgamated to consolidate the central city and major suburbs (2002-2005), and 
the last covers a phase of limited fragmentation, as a number of municipalities de-amalgamated while a majority 
remained consolidated (2006-2011). Since we are interested with the impact of mergers and demergers on short 
term trend, we have chosen to include the fi ve years before mergers and the fi ve years after demergers in our 
analysis. Th is allows us to take into account eff ects that can take more than one year to happen after demergers 
and to avoid that our conclusion rely only on an unusual year like the one just before mergers where some 
municipalities may have already modify their fi nancial behavior. In total, it gives us a 15 year period of municipal 
fi nancial data7.   
Th e database used in this study includes fi nancial data collected from the Quebec Ministry of Municipal 
Aff airs, Regions and Land Occupancy (MAMROT) and fi nancial reports produced by municipalities that are 
part of the territory of the Montreal Metropolitan Community (MMC). As of 2013, the MMC encompasses 
82 municipalities, 3.7 million residents and an area of over 4,360 square kilometers.8 Its largest city, Montreal, 
accounts for nearly 1.7 million inhabitants. Th e data for the research was collected on an annual basis from 1996 
to 2011. 
Th e number of municipalities in the MMC varies in the three study periods. Th ere were 106 municipalities 
in 1996 within actual MMC limits, but four were merged prior to 2001. Among other municipalities, three have 
incomplete fi nancial data, and one has been discarded as an outlier. Consequently, of the 102 municipalities of 
table 1, a total of 98 municipalities presents complete fi nancial data for the analysis. A total of 61 municipalities 
are in the same situation during the merger period and 78 after de-amalgamation. Table 1 provides a complete 
list of municipalities that were part of the MMC in 2001, the year prior to amalgamation with their population. 
Municipalities that were merged in 2002 are identifi ed with an M, while municipalities that de-amalgamated 
in 2006 are identifi ed with a D.
THE QUEST FOR EQUITY
Conceptual Framework
As mentioned, the defi nition of equity used in this study refers to fairness in the distribution of fi scal eff ort 
among municipal governments. A fair distribution of the fi scal eff ort is observed when municipalities have 
similar tax rates to fi nance similar expenditures. Th is situation is usually found when the tax base is proportionally 
distributed among municipalities. Based on this conception, two indicators guide our analysis. Th e fi rst is the 
distribution of the tax base. In Quebec, municipalities rely mainly on property tax to fi nance their expenditures. 
It is their only tax revenue and it represents more than 50 % of total revenues, including grants. Th e property tax 
is based on assessed property values. Th e assessment roll is maintained by municipal authorities and is updated 
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1 Richelieu 4,851 52 Côte-Saint-Luc 30,244 M D
2 St-Mathias-sur-Richelieu 4,149 53 Hampstead 6,974 M D
3 Chambly 20,342 54 Mont-Royal 18,682 M D
4 Carignan 5,915 55 Dorval 17,706 M D
5 Saint-Basile-le-Grand 12,385 56 L’Île-Dorval1 0 M D
6 McMasterville 3,984 57 Pointe-Claire 29,286 M D
7 Otterburn Park 7,866 58 Kirkland 20,434 M D
8 Saint-Jean-Baptiste 2,704 59 Beaconsfi eld 19,310 M D
9 Mont-Saint-Hilaire 14,270 60 Baie d’Urfé 3,813 M D
10 Beloeil 19,053 61 Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue 5,062 M D
11 St-Mathieu-de-Beloeil 2,236 62 Senneville 970 M D
12 Brossard 65,026 M D 63 Dollard-des-Ormeaux 48,206 M D
13 Saint-Lambert 21,051 M D 64 Saint-Mathieu 1,961
14 Boucherville 36,253 M D 65 Saint-Philippe 3,892
15 St-Bruno-de-Montarville 23,843 M D 66 La Prairie 18,896
16 Longueuil 128,016 M+ 67 Candiac 12,675
17 Greenfi eld Park 16,978 M 68 Delson 7,024
18 LeMoyne 4,855 M 69 Sainte-Catherine 15,953
19 Saint-Hubert 75,912 M 70 Saint-Constant 22,577
20 Sainte-Julie 26,580 71 Saint-Isidore 2,371
21 Saint-Amable 7,278 72 Mercier 9,442
22 Varennes 19,653 73 Châteauguay 41,003
23 Verchères 4,782 74 Léry 2,378
24 Calixa-Lavallée 495 75 Beauharnois 6,387 M+
25 Contrecoeur 5,222 76 Maple Grove 2,628 M
26 Charlemagne 5,662 77 Melocheville 2,449 M
27 Repentigny 54,550 M+ 78 Les Cèdres 5,128
28 Le Gardeur 17,668 M 79 Pointe-des-Cascades 913
29 Saint-Sulpice 3,343 80 L’Île-Perrot 9,375
30 L’Assomption 15,615 81 N-Dame-de-l’Île-Perrot 8,546
31 Terrebonne 43,149 M+ 82 Pincourt 10,107
32 Lachenaie 21,709 M 83 Terrasse-Vaudreuil 2,047
33 La Plaine 15,673 M 84 Vaudreuil-Dorion 19,920
34 Mascouche 29,556 85 Vaudreuil-sur-le-Lac 893
35 Laval 343,005 86 L’Île-Cadieux1 127
36 Montréal-Est2 3,547 M D 87 Hudson1 4,796
37 Montréal 1,039,534 M+ 88 Saint-Lazare 12,895
38 Anjou 38,015 M 89 Saint-Eustache 40,378
39 Lachine 40,222 M 90 Deux-Montagnes 17,080
40 LaSalle 73,983 M 91 Ste-Marthe-sur-le-Lac 8,742
41 Montréal-Nord 83,600 M 92 Pointe-Calumet 5,604
42 Outremont 22,933 M 93 Saint-Joseph-du-Lac 4,882
43 Pierrefonds 54,963 M 94 Oka - Municipalité 3,194
44 Roxboro 5,642 M 95 Boisbriand 26,729
45 Saint-Laurent 77,391 M 96 Sainte-Thérèse 24,269
46 Saint-Léonard 69,604 M 97 Blainville 36,029
47 Sainte-Geneviève 3,278 M 98 Rosemère 13,391
48 Verdun 60,564 M 99 Lorraine 9,476
49 L’Île Bizard 13,861 M 100 Bois-des-Filion 7,712
50 Westmount 19,727 M D 101 Ste-Anne-des-Plaines 12,908
51 Montréal-Ouest 5,172 M D 102 Mirabel 27,330
Note: M=Merger, M+= city gained territory D=Demerger. (1) Municipalities not considered in our analysis due to missing fi nancial data; (2) 
Extreme outlier not included in the analysis: very small population in a large industrial area. Source: MAMROT
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every three years following a uniform methodological standard. Since all municipalities do not update their roll 
on the same year, the Quebec Ministry of Municipal Aff airs produces a “standardized” property assessment value 
(SPA). Th is data yields global property assessments that are comparable on a yearly basis for all municipalities. 
Larger municipalities have a larger tax base. As such, size should not be a criterion to evaluate disparity. 
To overcome the size eff ect, it is expected that the distribution of the tax base among municipalities should be 
similar to the distribution of consumers of local public services (or local needs). Since we do not have data on 
local needs, the match between fi scal base and needs is hard to validate. To manage this problem, we use two 
diff erent imperfect measures of tax base. Th e fi rst one is a measure of SPA per capita, which is based on the 
assumption that local needs are correlated to population. In main employment or consumption centers, however, 
local needs may also be associated to commuters from neighboring communities. In that case, SPA per capita will 
overestimate the wealth of these municipalities. Th e second measure of municipal tax base we use is linked to the 
residential part of the tax base only. Th e residential SPA per capita (RSPA) represents in this view a measure of 
the tax capacity as perceived by residents only, assuming that revenues from taxes on commercial, industrial and 
institutional properties will strictly be used to fi nance non-residential needs. Since some municipalities fi nance 
residential services with non-residential taxes, this measure underestimates their fi scal wealth. In the end, both 
of our municipal tax base measures are biased, but their biases operates in opposite directions. If we can draw 
the same conclusions from both measures, we will consider them as robust.     
Since we are interested in the diff erences in per capita property value assessment between municipalities, 
and not in its evolution over time, an index is computed based on the yearly average of SPA and RSPA measures. 
Th e index is calculated as follows:
                (1)
where pit is the population of municipality i for year t and Pt is the total population of the metropolitan area for year t. By defi nition, the weighted average SPA index equals 1 in every year. Municipalities with an index over 
1 are considered wealthy, as their tax base is larger than their population share. Municipalities with SPA index 
under 1, on the other hand, are considered relatively poor. Th e same index is built with the RSPA. 
Th e second indicator of municipal disparities is the tax rate, which refers to what the Ministry of Municipal 
Aff airs calls the standardized global tax rate (SGTR), computed as the total tax revenues divided by the SPA. 
Th e relation between the tax rate and the tax base in not straightforward. On an equity point of view, we 
expect that, all else being equal, a smaller tax base will lead to larger tax rate. Consequently, disparities in the 
distribution of the tax base should lead to disparities in tax rates. Many factors may aff ect this relation though. 
For instance, municipalities with a smaller tax base may choose to lower expenditures in order to maintain their 
tax rate at a competitive level. Some municipalities may choose to rely more on fees or charges to lower their tax 
rate. Transfers from upper levels of government can also infl uence municipal tax rate. For all those reasons, we 
don’t expect our tax rate indicator to tell the exact same story as our SPA and RSPA indexes. 
Th e tax rate indicator has been converted to an index to make it comparable. Th e index of the SGTR is 
divided by the weighted average SGTR in the metropolitan area as follows:
 .             (3)
    
Our goal is to measure the impact of municipal reforms in Montreal on fi scal fairness. Assuming that 
amalgamation has a positive impact on equity, as is theorized, the fi scal eff ort gap between wealthy and poor 
municipalities should decrease. In other words, convergence should be detected.  Th e measure of convergence 
used here is σ-convergence (Quah 1993 ), which is based on the evolution of the coeffi  cient of variation (ratio 
of standard deviation to the mean). Th e coeffi  cient of variation is directly proportional to the spread of the 
distribution around the mean. Th erefore, a year-to-year decrease indicates convergence. As amalgamation 
occurred in 2002, we expect to see a breakpoint in σ -convergence at that time. Th e inverse is also expected with 
demergers in 2006.  
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Table 2 Evolution of SPA and RSPA indexes over the three periods of the study for merged and demerged municipalities 
in Montreal and Longueuil
Population in 
2001











Brossard 66,110 0,94 0,92 1,11 1,05
Saint-Lambert 21,761 1,21 1,17 1,65 1,53
Boucherville 37,581 1,35 1,27 1,34 1,27
Saint-Bruno-de-Montarville 24,392 1,21 1,22 1,30 1,27
Longueuil** 131,017 0,76 1,08 0,70 0,85 0,98 0,79
Greenfi eld-Park 17,681 0,77 0,86
Le Moyne 5,132 0,55 0,67
Saint-Hubert 79,164 0,72 0,84
Island of Montreal 1,792,434
Montreal** 1,029,828 0,95 1,23 1,05 0,89 1,04 0,97
Anjou 37,758 1,10 1,00
Lachine 40,053 1,05 0,89
LaSalle 73,316 0,79 0,87
Montréal-Nord 82,188 0,60 0,74
Outremont 21,825 1,51 2,07
Pierrefonds 54,502 0,75 1,01
Roxboro 5,574 0,76 1,04
Saint-Laurent 76,342 1,51 1,03
Saint-Léonard 71,891 0,85 0,95
Sainte-Geneviève 3,302 0,64 0,83
Verdun 60,521 0,77 0,96
L’Île-Bizard 13,895 1,10 1,43
Westmount 19,922 2,68 2,83 3,32 3,49
Montréal-Ouest 5,088 1,26 1,32 1,74 1,73
Côte-Saint-Luc 28,937 1,17 1,11 1,54 1,45
Hampstead 6,605 1,81 1,94 2,77 2,75
Mont-Royal 18,100 2,34 2,19 2,62 2,45
Dorval 17,300 2,29 2,08 1,30 1,21
Pointe-Claire 28,823 1,64 1,46 1,35 1,30
Kirkland 19,894 1,32 1,35 1,55 1,55
Beaconsfi eld 18,906 1,29 1,33 1,85 1,80
Baie-d’Urfé 3,731 2,23 2,28 2,26 2,17
Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue 5,076 1,58 1,30 1,12 1,00
Senneville 930 3,44 3,39 3,61 3,42
Dollard-des-Ormeaux 48,127 0,85 0,90 1,12 1,16
 Notes: (*) Average value for each period. (**) Central cities to which other municipalities were merged in 2002 or from which they have demerged 
in 2006.
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Tax Base Disparities
Th e evolution of the RSPA index in the metropolitan area is mapped in fi gures 1, 2 and 3, each presenting a 
single timeframe. Th e wealthiest municipalities (or inversely the poorest) have an index that is one standard 
deviation above (or below) the average for all municipalities in all periods. A wealthy municipality (or poor) has 
an index that is above (or below) the average by less than one standard deviation9. 
Figure 1 displays the initial situation. Th e majority of the wealthiest municipalities between 1996 and 2001 
are located on the Island of Montreal as well as around Longueuil. Many poor municipalities are also located on 
the Island of Montreal and around Longueuil. Th e City of Montreal and the City of Longueuil both have a poor 
endowment in terms of property assessment in this period. Th ese observations lend credence to the argument 
of fairness sustaining municipal reforms. Not only are major municipalities such as Montreal and Longueuil, 
considered poor, trying to capture higher property values outside their borders, but the initiated reforms are 
specifi cally targeting some of the wealthiest municipalities of the metropolitan area. From that point of view, the 
impact on fairness seems obvious.    
Figure 2 shows the situation after consolidation. Th e Island of Montreal now forms a single municipality. 
During this period, the new City of Montreal is therefore wealthy, while Longueuil, despite improvement, 
remains poor. Unfortunately, the number of poor and very poor municipalities remains still in the metropolitan 
area during this period. Th is raises a question about the new distribution of wealth. In agglomerating the 
wealthiest municipalities, have municipal reforms left poor municipalities to fend for themselves? Th e impact 
on fairness may not be as clear as it seems.
Th e situation changes again after the demergers, as seen in fi gure 3. Montreal has returned to the poor 
category. Th e motivation for demerger seems clear. Of the 13 municipalities that have demerged from Montreal 
and for which we have information, 10 were classifi ed among the wealthiest after demergers, two were wealthy 
and only one was poor. In Longueuil, of the 4 municipalities that recovered their autonomy, 3 ranked among the 
wealthiest and one among the wealthy. According to these observations, demergers are also expected to have a 
signifi cant impact on equity in the metropolitan area. 
As we have mentioned already, RSPA index underestimate the wealth of central cities like Montreal. Using 
SPA index in fi gures 1, 2 and 3 would have moderated our conclusions, but not necessarily changed the picture. 
Details of SPA and RSPA indexes for merged and demerged municipalities on the Island of Montreal and 
around Longueuil appear in table 2. We can see that that the SPA index for Montreal is higher than the RSPA 
index. Th e inverse is observed however for Longueuil. On the Island of Montreal, during the period before 
municipal reforms (1996-2001), all municipalities were wealthier in terms of RSPA than the central City of 
Montreal, with the exceptions of LaSalle, Montréal-Nord and Sainte-Geneviève. Looking at the SPA, we 
observe that Pierrefonds, Roxboro, L’Île-Bizard, Côte-Saint-Luc and Dollard-des-Ormeaux were also poorer 
that Montreal before mergers. Amalgamation still improved the fi scal situation of 13 of the 26 municipalities 
involved in the merger of Montreal for which we have information when considering SPA and 10 out of 26 
when considering RSPA. Th ese municipalities account for nearly 85 % of the population in 2001 for both cases. 
Th is means that a very high proportion of resident have seen the fi scal situation of their municipality improved 
by mergers on the Island of Montreal. With the exception of Outremont, all municipalities where residents saw 
their fi scal position deteriorate with mergers in 2002 on both indexes have chosen to demerge in 2006. In the 
period following demergers (2006-2011), these municipalities all have higher SPA and RSPA scores than the 
City of Montreal. With the exception of Côte-Saint-Luc and Dollard-des-Ormeaux, there was a fi scal gain in 
all demergers (as for these two exceptions, the fi scal gain was only observed with the RSPA index).
Data on the Longueuil area tells a similar story. From the 8 municipalities involved in the merger in 2002, 
4 improved their RSPA position and 5 improved their SPA position with the reform. Th ese 5 municipalities 
account for 78  % of population in 2001. Th erefore, a majority of residents saw the fi scal situation of their 
municipality improved with amalgamation (61 % when measured with the RSPA index). All municipalities that 
worsen their RSPA position have also opted to demerge in 2006. Th ey all show higher RSPA index score than 
that of the City of Longueuil for the 2006-2011 period, suggesting that fi scal gain was a major determinant of 
demerger in Longueuil as well. Th e only exception is Brossard, which has not improved its SPA index position 
with demerger.
Th e computed σ -convergence of SPA and RSPA indexes for the 1996-2011 period appears in fi gure 4. Two 
forms of each measures are presented in this fi gure, one built with weighted means and standard deviations and 
Canadian Journal of Urban Research / Revue canadienne de recherche urbaine
CJUR summer 27:1 201850
one with unweighted means and standard deviations. Th e weights used refer to the proportion of population. As 
expected, all measures show a sharp decline in the coeffi  cient of variation after 2001, as municipal amalgamation 
came into eff ect. Th us, municipal consolidation made the distribution of the tax base more equitable for both 
indexes. Th e inverse eff ect is noted in 2006 due to de-amalgamation, since municipalities that successfully 
demerged are, in most cases, among the wealthiest. 
Figure 4
Looking at the tax base only, the impact of municipal reforms on equity is obvious. Th e 2002 reform forced the 
merger of many of the wealthiest municipalities in the metropolitan region with major cities like Montreal and 
Longueuil, considered fi scally poor. Th e new distribution of municipal tax base among the population is clearly 
more equitable after mergers. Inversely, in 2006, the demerger allowed some of the wealthiest municipalities 
to regain control over their tax base. Figure 4 shows that disparities after demergers in the metropolitan area 
reached a similar level as the situation prevailing before the reforms.    
     
Tax rate disparities
Th e tax rate indicator paints a slightly diff erent picture. Measures of σ-convergence for the SGTR index appear 
in fi gure 5. Th ese measurements were computed twice: once with weighted means and standard deviations and 
once with unweighted means and standard deviations. Looking at the weighted curve, a clear breakpoint in the 
evolution of convergence that coincides with the 2002 reform is visible in the data, as expected. Th is means that 
mergers not only contributed to a more equitable distribution of the tax base, but also to convergence in tax rates. 
What makes the unweighted curve interesting though is not the impact of mergers on fairness, but the impact 
of demergers. Despite several of the wealthiest municipalities regaining control over their tax base in 2006, 
disparities in tax rates were not aff ected. Gains in terms of equity as measured with tax rate seem to endure over 
time, even after demergers. Th e creation of agglomeration councils is one potential explanation for this situation. 
As mentioned, demerged municipalities only recovered part of their autonomy after 2006. Th ey were henceforth 
considered “tied municipalities” since they are obligated to contribute fi nancially to agglomeration councils in 
which they have very weak political representation. Th ese agglomeration councils produce nearly 45 % of all 
municipal services on their territory and serve as a tool to use the tax base of de-amalgamated municipalities to 
fi nance major infrastructure projects and operation in central cities. 
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Brossard 66,110 0,76 0,93
Saint-Lambert 21,761 0,63 1,01
Boucherville 37,581 0,72 0,90
Saint-Bruno-de-Montarville 24,392 0,61 0,89
Longueuil** 131,017 0,88 0,83 0,95
Greenfi eld-Park 17,681 0,85
Le Moyne 5,132 0,89
Saint-Hubert 79,164 0,98
Island of Montreal 1,792,434













Westmount 19,922 0,65 0,90
Montréal-Ouest 5,088 1,08 1,31
Côte-Saint-Luc 28,937 0,93 1,15
Hampstead 6,605 1,04 1,13
Mont-Royal 18,100 0,69 0,85
Dorval 17,300 0,81 0,97
Pointe-Claire 28,823 0,88 1,09
Kirkland 19,894 0,91 1,02
Beaconsfi eld 18,906 0,89 1,12
Baied’Urfé 3,731 0,64 0,83
Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue 5,076 0,77 1,06
Senneville 930 0,59 0,79
Dollard-des-Ormeaux 48,127 1,04 1,06
Notes: (*) Average value for each period. (**) Central cities to which other municipalities were merged in 2002 or from which they 
have demerged in 2006.
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Figure 5
Conclusions on the convergence of tax rate are not as clear as with tax base. Even if the weighted measure 
of σ-convergence in fi gure 5 shows a clear decline in tax rate disparities occurring with mergers in 2002, the 
unweighted measures does not follow the same path. To be clear, the unweighted curve displays convergence 
over time, but without a sharp drop in 2002. What explains this diff erence?      
Table 3, which details the SGTR index for merged and demerged municipalities on the Island of Montreal 
and around Longueuil, gives insight into this divergence. We see that the City of Montreal’s pre-merger tax 
rate was much higher than that of any other municipality on the Island of Montreal. In fact, it was the second 
highest tax rate in the whole metropolitan area at that time. Municipal reforms improved this relative situation, 
driving Montreal’s tax rate closer to the metropolitan average. Most of the municipalities merged with Montreal 
had a tax rate closer to the unweighted average in the 1996-2001 period. A small number of municipalities, such 
as Westmount, Mont-Royal, Outremont, Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue and Senneville, had very low tax rates, far 
below the average. In this context, the mergers have only brought a limited number of municipalities closer to 
the average, but these municipalities encompassed large populations. Th at explains why the weighted impact is 
clear while the unweighted eff ect remains insignifi cant.   
On the Island of Montreal, the mergers improved the relative tax rate of 4 municipalities out of the 26 
involved in the reform and for which we have data, but these municipalities account for 65% of the population. 
As such, it is evident that amalgamation was mainly benefi cial to the City of Montreal. Even after demergers, 
that City’s tax rate remained slightly under the average. Inversely, all municipalities opting for demergers on the 
Island of Montreal have set their tax rate at a higher level after 2006, making their post-merger position worse 
relative to their pre-merger standing. Of the 13 municipalities that have de-amalgamated, only 5 have been able 
to set tax rates lower than the City of Montreal after demergers. 
Th e same situation is seen in Longueuil, but in a context where tax rates were already catching up to the 
metropolitan average. Th e merger improved the relative position of 4 of the 8 municipalities involved in the 
reform, representing 61 % of the population. Th e SGTR index for the City of Longueuil increased signifi cantly 
after 2006, but still moderately in comparison to its newly demerged neighbors. Nevertheless, 3 of 4 demerged 
municipalities were able to set a tax rate lower than the City of Longueuil’s after demergers. 
All in all, we observe that following de-amalgamation, the wealthiest municipalities, which make up the 
bulk of demerged municipalities, set higher tax rates after 2006 compared to before the reforms. In this sense, 
we can conclude that a higher level of fi scal fairness persists even after the demergers.       
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CONCLUSION
 Th e main objective of this research is to evaluate the impact of amalgamation and de-amalgamation in the 
Montreal metropolitan region on fi scal fairness between 1996 and 2011. By defi nition, amalgamation 
improves equity. In a context of partial implementation, the impact on equity is dependent upon the specifi c 
municipalities that are consolidated. In the case of Montreal, because the reforms were specifi cally targeting 
some of the wealthiest municipalities, our results clearly show that mergers have improved equity. Th e impact of 
de-amalgamation on fairness, on the other hand, is not straightforward. Our results show that disparities in tax 
base have increased with demergers, while tax rates were still converging.     
A major assumption upon which our analysis is founded also appears to be weak. Our defi nition of fairness 
is based on the supposition that a large amalgamated municipality applies a consistent tax rate for the same 
bundle of services on its entire territory. Th is may not be the case since inequalities may persist within a city after 
amalgamation, as Meloche & Vaillancourt (2015) fi nd in Montreal. More than ten years after amalgamation, 
disparities between the boroughs of the City of Montreal still refl ect some of the pre-merger conditions. In this 
context, amalgamation may not be suffi  cient to foster fairness among local governments in a metropolitan area. 
Our fi ndings strengthen some of the economic arguments that justify the compulsory amalgamation of 
large metropolitan areas. As Denters & al. (2014) argued, as long as there is a democratic cost to amalgamation, 
although small, benefi ts in terms of equity must be signifi cant in order to justify this course of action. In this 
case, advantages will be signifi cant if fi scal segregation represents a threat to fi scal sustainability, as well as 
when amalgamation results in the merger of wealthy municipalities with the deprived ones. Otherwise, the 
focus of municipal reforms may be better oriented on other issues than the creation of consolidated municipal 
governments.    
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Notes
1   In 2012, total municipal spending in Québec was 18 billion $CAD (Ministry of Municipal Aff airs) and the 
provincial government’s total consolidated spending was 90 billion $CAD (Government of Quebec, 2012-
2013 Budget).   
2   Government of Quebec, Ministry of Municipal Aff airs (MAMROT).
3   Government of Quebec, Ministry of Municipal Aff airs (MAMROT). Th ese numbers refer to 2012 fi nan-
cial reports.
4   Th e Montreal Urban Community (Communauté urbaine de Montréal) was a regional government with juris-
diction over the territory of the Island of Montreal (including Ile-Bizard and Ile-Dorval) from 1970 until the 
end of 2001. Elected offi  cials from associated municipalities sat on the administrative board of the Community. 
Since the City of Montreal controlled the majority of seats on the board, decisions needed a double majority 
to be adopted (majority of votes and majority of municipalities). Th e Community was mainly responsible for 
transit, police and water services.     
5   See the previous footnote for details on the Montreal Urban Community. Th e Agglomeration of Montreal 
is a regional government with the exact same borders as the Urban Community and with very similar respon-
sibilities (with fi re services added). Th e major diff erence is that although Montreal holds the same number of 
seats on the administrative board as tied municipalities, it controls 87 % of the votes (equal to its population 
weight). No double majority is required. Th e Mayor of Montreal assigns all the seats for the City of Montreal. 
Th e City of Montreal provides all public services for the Agglomeration.    
6   Considering that central cities like Montreal and Longueuil are divided into boroughs as they are part of 
agglomeration councils and part of the Montreal Metropolitan Community, we can say that there are four 
tiers of government in the metropolitan area. Boroughs represent a very week tier in Longueil however and 
the Metropolitan Community have very few responsibilities. Most municipalities in the Metropolitan Com-
munity are not part of an agglomeration, neither are they divided into boroughs. Th is situation is idiosyncratic 
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to Montréal and Longueuil. Meloche and Vaillancourt (2015) provide more details about this peculiar gover-
nance structure of Montreal.   
7    We have also chosen a period that correspond to census years in Canada in order to be able to cross some 
municipal fi nancial data with socio-economic data if needed. Th is eventuality was not required for the analysis 
presented here however. 
8   2013 data. Montreal Metropolitan Community (www.cmm.qc.ca). Th e Montreal Metropolitan Community 
was created in 2001. It is a weak form of metropolitan government with a territory similar to the census metro-
politan area. Responsibilities of the Metropolitan Community are limited to regional planning. Th e administra-
tive board is composed of mayors from associated municipalities.      
9   We use weighted averages and weighted standard deviations. Doing so, municipalities are distributed 
around the average situation of a standard consumer and not the average situation of all municipalities. Since 
poor municipalities tend to be larger in size, we fi nd more municipalities above the average in 1996-2001 and 
2006-2011. Th e inverse is observed during the 2002-2005 period. 
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